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Abstract: Illusionism is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely 
seems to exist. Many opponents to the thesis take it to be obviously false. David Chalmers has 
articulated this reaction to illusionism in terms of a “Moorean” argument against illusionism. 
This argument contends that illusionism is false, because it is obviously true that we have 
phenomenal experiences. I argue that this argument fails, by showing that its defenders cannot 
maintain that its crucial premise (properly understood) has the kind support needed for the 




 Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness states that phenomenal consciousness 
does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Many philosophers, even amongst those who think 
that the view is coherent and supported by strong arguments, think that it can be ruled out 
conclusively, as it is obviously false. David Chalmers has recently articulated this reaction to 
illusionism in the form of a “Moorean argument” against the view (Chalmers, 2018). The 
crucial premise of this argument is that people sometimes feel pain. On the basis of this premise, 
and together with definitional claims to the effect that illusionism entails that no one feels pain, 
Chalmers concludes that illusionism is false. The crucial premise of this argument is supposed 
to be obviously true, and particularly strongly supported (more than any considerations that 
might support illusionism), in a way that is independent of the prior acceptance of any 
philosophical views potentially entailing the falsity of illusionism (which is why the argument 
arguably does not beg the question against illusionism). 
 Does the Moorean argument allow us to rule out illusionism, even if we admit that the 
view might be coherent, and independently supported by strong arguments? I will argue to the 
contrary. The Moorean argument fails, because its defenders cannot ultimately maintain that its 
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crucial premise (properly understood so as to support the conclusion of the argument) is 
justified in the way required for the argument to succeed, without at some point relying on the 
antecedent acceptance of contentious philosophical views, which arguably begs the question 
against illusionism. Put otherwise, the Moorean argument fails to rule out illusionism without 
begging the question. 
 I present illusionism about phenomenal consciousness (§2), as well as Chalmers’ 
Moorean argument against illusionism (§3). I then argue that, whilst illusionism is committed 
to denying the existence of phenomenal pain, it does not deny that people feel pain in other 
senses (functional and normative). This restricts the domain of seemingly obvious claims that 
illusionists must deny (§4). Focusing on the core of the Moorean argument, I argue that, given 
the nature of the illusionist arguments (scientific-cum-philosophical arguments, and not purely 
philosophical arguments), the key premise of the Moorean argument against illusionism needs 
to be considerably more supported than the premises of “standard” Moorean arguments (§5). I 
show that the defender of the Moorean argument owes us some sort of justification, to the effect 
that their crucial premise is appropriately supported, and that this very justification will face the 
same constraints and difficulties as the justification of the key premise of the Moorean argument 
against illusionism. Taking the dialectical battle to the second-order level, and then third-order 
level, etc. I argue that the defender of the Moorean argument ultimately has no choice but to 
appeal to some contentious philosophical view, which arguably begs the question against 
illusionism (§6). 
 
2. Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness 
 
Phenomenal states (or “conscious experiences”) are putative mental states endowed with 
phenomenal properties. In virtue of these phenomenal properties, there is “something it is like” 
to be in these states. Seeing a red apple, smelling honeysuckle, feeling a sudden pain in the 
elbow – these are supposed to be typical examples of phenomenal states. A subject who enters 
such states is phenomenally conscious. Many philosophers think that phenomenal states can be 
distinguished conceptually (if not in reality) from access-conscious states, which are defined as 
mental states bearing content available for use in reasoning and the rational control of speech 
and action (Block, 1995). 
Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness 
does not exist, but merely seems to exist. For illusionists (as opposed to realists) about 
phenomenal consciousness, we never enter phenomenal states, and there is nothing it is like to 




be anyone. Rather, we simply enter introspective states that incorrectly represent that we are in 
phenomenal states, thus creating the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. First versions of 
this view were suggested in the 1960’s (Feyerabend, 1963; Rorty, 1965). It found prominent 
defenders in the late 1980’s (Dennett, 1988, 1991; Rey, 1995), sometimes under the label 
“eliminativism”.2 The view has, in recent times, received a fair amount of attention (Dennett, 
2017; Graziano, 2013; Humphrey, 2011; Kammerer, 2019; Pereboom, 2011), as well as the 
label “illusionism” (Frankish, 2016).  
Two things must be kept in mind about illusionism. First, what I describe here is what Keith 
Frankish calls “strong illusionism” (Frankish, 2016, p. 15‑16), distinct from the position he 
dubs “weak illusionism”. For weak illusionists, phenomenal consciousness exists, but does not 
have many of the properties it is often thought to have – it merely seems to have these properties. 
In what follows I will concern myself only with strong illusionism, and so will henceforth use 
“illusionism” (without qualification) to refer to strong illusionism. Second, illusionists think 
that there are no phenomenal states in reality. To talk about the real states and properties which 
are usually thought to be phenomenal (but which are not phenomenal), they might talk of 
“quasi-phenomenal” states/properties (Frankish, 2016, p. 15). A quasi-phenomenal property is 
a non-phenomenal, physical property (possibly a wildly disjunctive property and plausibly a 
brain property) that we typically misrepresent as phenomenal through introspection. States that 
have quasi-phenomenal properties are quasi-phenomenal states. For an illusionist, when I open 
my eyes in front of a red apple, I merely have a quasi-phenomenal perception of red, endowed 
with quasi-phenomenal redness. 
Interest in illusionism has grown in recent years, partly because it provides a robust defense 
of physicalism regarding the human mind – an attractive metaphysical position, threatened by 
arguments and thought experiments focusing on the alleged non-physical nature of phenomenal 
consciousness (Chalmers, 1996; Jackson, 1982). For years, most philosophers of mind have 
endorsed physicalism, whilst favoring a realist view of consciousness. Typically, these 
philosophers countered anti-physicalist arguments by adopting what David Chalmers dubbed 
“type-B” physicalism (Chalmers, 2002): the view that phenomenal consciousness ontologically 
reduces to physical processes, although such reduction always remains somewhat opaque to us 
– maybe to the point that consciousness will always seem persistently distinct from physical 
processes (Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005; Balog, 2012; Kriegel, 2009; Loar, 1997; Papineau, 
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2002; Sturgeon, 1994). This last view (often associated with the “Phenomenal Concept 
Strategy” (Stoljar, 2005)), which promised a way to defend physicalism while accounting for 
the genuine difficulties encountered by reductive theories of consciousness, has been intensely 
criticized in recent years (Chalmers, 2007, 2018; Frankish, 2012; Goff, 2011; Levine, 2001, 
2007; Nida-Rümelin, 2007). The debate is still very much alive (Diaz-León, 2014; Elpidorou, 
2016), but the idea that this approach succeeds now seems less plausible than it once did. Strong 
illusionism, on the other hand, allows one to defend physicalism in a simple but radical way – 
by straightforwardly denying the existence of phenomenal states. It then found vocal support 
from both proponents (some describing it as the “obvious default theory of consciousness” 
(Dennett, 2016)) as well as from opponents (“if I were a materialist, I would be an illusionist” 
(Chalmers, 2018, p. 9)). 
As for the positive arguments for the view, two of them seem particularly strong. The first 
is the argument from the anomalousness of phenomenal consciousness (Frankish, 2016, p. 
27‑28). It starts with the premise that phenomenal consciousness is anomalous with respect to 
“standard” properties (such as the physico-functional properties described by natural science): 
it resists explanations in physical or structural terms (there is a “hard problem of 
consciousness”), and seems detectable only from a certain perspective (the “first-person 
perspective”). One then adds the premise that apparent anomalousness is strong evidence for 
illusion, and thereby concludes that, if consciousness could be an illusion (i.e. illusionism is a 
coherent possibility), then we have good reason to believe that it is one. 
The second is the argument from coincidence (Chalmers, 1996, p. 186‑187, 2018, p. 44‑49; 
Frankish, 2016, p. 27).3 It starts from the premise that it is possible to explain all our intuitions 
about phenomenal consciousness (including the intuition that we are phenomenally conscious 
at all) in a way that is independent of consciousness (at least descriptively independent, that is: 
without having to mention consciousness itself, and using a purely physical/structural 
vocabulary). This premise is supposedly justified by our (present and forthcoming) scientific 
theories (of phenomenal introspection, intuitive dualism, etc.). It then adds the premise that, if 
one can explain our intuitions about consciousness independently of consciousness, and if these 
intuitions are correct, their correctness is a coincidence. Assuming that their correctness cannot 
be a coincidence (which seems extremely likely), the conclusion is that our intuitions are not 
correct. This leads to the view that we are not phenomenally conscious. 
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3. The Moorean argument against illusionism 
 
Illusionism remains a minority position. This is only partially explained by the force of the 
numerous objections mounted against illusionism. Some have argued that illusionism is 
incoherent (Nida-Rümelin, 2016). Others have claimed that it is theoretically weaker than the 
alternatives (Balog, 2016; Mandik, 2016; Merlo, 2020; Prinz, 2016; Schwitzgebel, 2016), or 
that its apparent attractiveness relies on some definitional confusion (Niikawa, 2020) or 
contestable assumptions (Schwitzgebel, draft). 
However, the main reason why illusionism is rejected by most philosophers of mind, is 
probably that it simply seems obviously false to them. This intuition, sometimes also at play in 
the arguments mentioned above, has been articulated by David Chalmers in terms of a direct 
“Moorean”4 argument against illusionism. Chalmers grants that illusionism is coherent and 
supported by powerful arguments (Chalmers, 2018, p. 44‑49). However, he also thinks that it 
is false, and that the best argument against it goes as follows: 
 
Premise 1: People sometimes feel pain 
Premise 2: If illusionism5 is true, no one feels pain 
Conclusion: Illusionism is false 
 
Premise 2, according to Chalmers, follows from the claims that feeling pain is a conscious 
experience, and that illusionism denies that there are conscious experiences. This seems true as 
a matter of definition, although Chalmers points at possible quibbles. A sophisticated illusionist 
could deny that illusionism implies that there are no conscious experiences – insisting that 
illusionism only denies that there are phenomenally conscious experiences. Alternatively, the 
illusionist could admit that they deny the existence of conscious experiences, but insist that in 
the most important senses of feeling pain (functional senses) they do not deny that people 
sometimes feel pain. However, I think that we should grant Chalmers that there is at least a 
significant reading of “feeling pain” (the phenomenal reading) for which they deny that anyone 
feels pain. 
As for premise 1, Chalmers takes it to be obviously true. He concedes that we sometimes 
discover – for example, through scientific inquiry – that some claims that seemed obviously 
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true are really false. One canonical example can be found in the history of physics: while it 
seemed obviously true, say, that two spatially distinct events can sometimes happen at the same 
time in some absolute sense, modern physics (special relativity) showed that this is in fact not 
the case (there is no absolute simultaneity). However, Chalmers thinks that this does not 
undermine the argument. In his view, what makes his argument especially strong is that premise 
1 is not only obvious, it is: (a) more obvious that any scientific or philosophical view that might 
support illusionism; moreover, (b) this premise is antecedently supported – its particularly 
strong support does not depend on any contentious philosophical view or consideration 
(potentially implying the falsity of illusionism). Both of these two conditions are crucial to the 
success of the argument. Indeed, if the claim that people feel pain were not more obvious than 
any scientific or philosophical consideration that might lend support to illusionism, the modus 
tollens proposed by Chalmers would not be stronger than the opposed modus ponens. Besides, 
if this particularly strong support did not hold independently of any contentious philosophical 
views (potentially implying the falsity of illusionism), the argument would beg the question. 
This Moorean argument articulates a very strong anti-illusionist intuition, which I think 
explains the relative lack of popularity of illusionism. It is representative of the kind of 
reasoning that many philosophers spontaneously make (sometimes explicitly (Frances, 2008, 
p. 241; Searle, 1997; Strawson, 1994, p. 101)), when they recognize that illusionism has 
theoretical virtues, while thinking nevertheless that they can conclusively reject it, as 
phenomenal experiences are obviously real. What also makes this argument particularly 
interesting is that its success is not supposed to depend on the exact force of the arguments in 
favor of illusionism. We do not have to examine the subtleties of illusionist theories to know 
that it is false. We can be fully confident of it, because it is simply obvious that we are 
phenomenally conscious. 
Because the Moorean argument is representative of a widespread reaction to illusionism, it 
is particularly useful to examine – it provides a way to discuss a very popular reason to reject 
illusionism, which is (explicitly or implicitly) very often operative in anti-illusionist positions. 
Here I intend to show that, upon close examination, the argument fails. 
 
4. Pain, pain, and pain – what the illusionist really denies 
 
I grant Chalmers this: there is a reading of “feeling pain” (the phenomenal reading) on which 
illusionists deny that anyone ever feels pain. Moreover, it seems obvious that people feel pain 
in this phenomenal sense. However, contrary to what Chalmers suggests, this phenomenal sense 




is not the only sense in which it appears obvious that people feel pain.6 There are at least two 
other such senses of “feeling pain”, about which the illusionist does not need to deny anything. 
We must start with a clear conception of these two senses, which contrasts them with the 
phenomenal one, to know what the illusionist really denies – to avoid making illusionism seem 
more counterintuitive than it is. 
 
A. Pain – phenomenal 
 
“Feeling pain” has a phenomenal reading, which corresponds to phenomenal pain – the felt 
quality of pain, represented through introspection (when, say, I slam a door on my fingers and 
focus upon what I feel). As is often noted, it is difficult (if not impossible) to define phenomenal 
qualities in linguistic terms: many have judged them to be ineffable. I assume here that we 
nevertheless have a clear introspective grasp of what phenomenal pain is, which allows us to 
distinguish it from other phenomenal qualities, and to think, in a cognitively significant way, 
that it (as a case of phenomenal consciousness) might create a hard problem.7 I grant that it 
seems obvious, introspectively, that we sometimes enter phenomenal pain. Illusionists deny 
that there are feelings of pain in this sense. 
 
B. Pain – functional  
 
However, “feeling pain” also has a functional reading. In that sense, it means (roughly) 
entering a state playing a certain functional role. We might presently have a vague and 
incomplete understanding of the details of this functional role; yet it seems obvious that, in this 
functional sense, people sometimes feel pain. It seems obvious that, when people suffer bodily 
damage, psychological distress, etc., they often enter states that tend to generate avoidant or 
fighting behavior. It seems obvious that the tokening of these states cannot always be known 
“from the outside” (with ordinary means) and that people themselves are often in a better 
position than others to assess whether or not they are in such states. It also seems obvious that 
these states are usually what makes me say that I am in pain, what makes me complain, cry, 
scream, etc., that they tend to capture my attention and generate specific streams of thoughts, 
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hopes, desires and intentions (e.g. “I hate this, I hope this will stop soon, I want to kill this 
dentist, I should have asked for anesthesia”). 
We know that people sometimes feel pain in this sense on the basis of introspection8, 
empathy, testimony, our naïve theory of mind, scientific inquiry, etc. The claim that no one 
feels pain in this sense would be really quite an extraordinary one to make – at least as 
preposterous, say, as the claims that there are no trees in the world (all apparent trees are painted 
concrete sculptures!) or that Tuesdays never take place (we go directly from Mondays to 
Wednesdays and generate false Tuesday-memories). Luckily, illusionists do not deny that 
people feel pain in that sense. They think that feelings of pain, in the functional sense, are 
perfectly real, although they happen to be merely (or merely accompanied by) quasi-
phenomenal states instead of phenomenal states.9 
 
C. Pain – normative 
 
Finally, our talk of “feeling pain” often comes with associated normative connotations.10 
When we say that people feel pain, we often speak about the fact that people sometimes (e.g. 
when they intensely burn their fingers) enter mental states which are awful for them; mental 
states which are in themselves bad, independently of their causal consequences (they are 
intrinsically bad). These states are typically conceived of as justifying or rationalizing certain 
behaviors (e.g. avoiding behaviors: we put gloves on when removing trays from the oven, as 
this averts our undergoing the experience of burning our fingers). We often think of them as 
states which make their bearer a proper object of empathy, and maybe thus create certain duties 
for others (e.g. we ought to tell someone to put on gloves before removing plates from the 
oven). 
Thus, we can then isolate a normative reading of the expression “feeling pain”, which 
corresponds to states normatively characterized as above: states that are intrinsically bad, 
rationalizing certain behaviors (avoiding, fighting, etc.), calling for empathy, and maybe 
creating duties. 
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The claim that people sometimes feel pain, in the normative sense, seems obvious.11 It seems 
obvious, say, that I feel (normative) pain when the dentist touches my nerve, or that my friend 
feels (normative) pain when they burn their fingers while removing plates from the oven with 
their bare hands. More dramatically, it seems obvious that victims of illness, abuse, violence, 
rape and torture, all feel very intense physical and psychological (normative) pain. All this 
seems obvious to us for a variety of reasons: we know that people sometimes feel such pain on 
the basis of introspection (we know that things are awful for us just by focusing on what happens 
to us!), testimony (others tell us!), empathy (we see and hear others having these awful 
episodes). It is one of the most well-grounded pieces of commonsense that people sometimes 
feel normative pain. Denying that people feel pain in this sense would be denying something 
awfully obvious. Such denial could also easily appear morally perverse. 
Illusionists do not have to deny people feel pain in this normative sense. Some illusionists 
might deny it (although I failed to see any illusionist endorsing such denial), and it could be 
that avoiding such denial would generate serious theoretical constraints for illusionists, as it 
would force them to reject some (arguably intuitive) principles connecting the negative value 
of pain to its phenomenality.12 However, it is simply not a part of the illusionist view that 
normative pain does not exist. 
So, there are at least three readings of “feeling pain”, and illusionists only have to deny that 
people feel pain in one of them. While it is often recognized that illusionists do not deny the 
reality of functional pain, one might be tempted to underestimate the obviousness of this 
functional pain.13 This could in turn lead one to overestimate the extent to which illusionists 
deny what is really obvious about pain. This appears to be what Chalmers does when he insists 
that the phenomenal sense of pain is the introspectively obvious one. Besides, philosophers 
discussing illusionism do not distinguish explicitly between the phenomenal sense of pain and 
its normative sense. However, the distinction is crucial. Indeed, it is plausible that many 
philosophers are inclined to believe that normative pain requires, in some strong 
(metaphysical?) sense, phenomenal pain, in a way in which functional pain might not. We can 
see this clearly when we consider zombies: most philosophers recognize that they can (at least 
superficially) conceive of zombies and they grant that zombies have functional pain but lack 
phenomenal pain. However, many might also intuit that zombies necessarily lack normative 
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pain, precisely because they lack phenomenal pain, so that, for example, when a zombie burns 
their fingers, nothing really intrinsically bad ensues. People with such intuitions might think 
that illusionists deny that there is normative pain. Illusionists would then deny not only one, but 
two obvious things, which would in turn provide its detractors with two supplementary reasons 
to reject illusionism: one epistemic reason (the existence of normative pain is itself obvious) 
and one moral reason (denying the existence of normative pain seems morally perverse).14 This 
last reason might be seen as overwhelming and incommensurable with reasons to embrace 
illusionism (reasons to believe illusionism are purely epistemic, while this reason to reject it 
has a moral dimension). However, as illusionists do not have to deny normative pain, these 
extra reasons do not hold. 
 
5. The obviousness of phenomenal states and the Moorean argument 
 
Illusionists do not deny the reality of functional or normative pain – only that of phenomenal 
pain. Is that enough to get the Moorean argument going? 
Consider Moorean arguments in general. Contemporary philosophers (as opposed to many 
Great Dead Philosophers15) seem overall willing to accept such direct defenses of common 
sense beliefs against philosophical arguments to the contrary (Fine, 2001, p. 2; Gupta, 2006, p. 
178; Kelly, 2005; Lewis, 1973, p. 88; Lycan, 2001; references taken from Rinard, 2013), 
usually traced back to Moore’s “proof of an external world” (Moore, 1939) – although there is 
not much agreement regarding precisely how such “Moorean” arguments are supposed to 
work.16 One point which is usually agreed upon, however, is that Moorean arguments can be 
successfully mounted against purely philosophical arguments attacking common-sense beliefs, 
but not against scientific arguments. As Lycan puts it (Lycan, 2001, p. 40‑41): 
Common-sense beliefs can be corrected, even trashed entirely, by careful empirical 
investigation and scientific theorizing […] Common sense must yield to evidence, as I 
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have said, but it need not yield to bare metaphysical pronouncement […] No purely 
philosophical premise can ever (legitimately) have as strong a claim to our allegiance 
as can a humble common-sense proposition such as Moore’s autobiographical ones. 
Science can correct common sense; metaphysics and philosophical "intuition" can only 
throw spitballs.17 
However, if this is correct, it is quite doubtful that one can build a Moorean argument 
against illusionism. Illusionism is not supposed to be supported by purely philosophical a priori 
arguments, but by scientific-cum-philosophical arguments, with some crucial premises 
supposedly justified by science. This is particularly clear when one considers the illusionist 
argument from coincidence (although I suspect the same could be said for the argument from 
the anomalousness of phenomenal consciousness). It crucially relies on the premise that it is 
possible to explain all our intuitions about phenomenal consciousness without ever mentioning 
consciousness (in purely physical/structural terms, say). But this premise is not an a priori 
premise, and is rather taken to be justified by science – and we are betting that it will be 
ultimately fully vindicated by the results of future research (say, on phenomenal introspection, 
or on intuitive dualism) carried out by scientists (psychologists, neuroscientists, etc.).  
If this is correct, a Moorean argument against illusionism would be more akin to a 
hypothetical Moorean argument defending the view that absolute simultaneity is real (going 
against the scientific argument based on special relativity), and less like the standard Moorean 
argument defending the view that we know that the external world exists (against a priori 
skeptical arguments). This would be bad news for the defender of the Moorean argument 
against illusionism. 
(Note that this reasoning does not presuppose that there is a clear and cut distinction 
between science and philosophy (Lycan, 2001, n. 11). There might be borderline cases.) 
How would the defenders of the Moorean argument answer? Maybe they could deny 
that arguments in favor of illusionism are scientific in the same sense as those against the reality 
of absolute simultaneity. They could say that: (a) the supposedly ‘scientific’ premises of 
illusionist arguments are not as well justified;  or (b) arguments for illusionism always include, 
on top of their scientific premises, philosophical premises (for example, the epistemological 
principle that one should not believe in extraordinary coincidences). However, there are serious 
problems with such answers, which is probably why Chalmers himself does not seem to take 
this route. Indeed, (a) would make the Moorean argument against illusionism very vulnerable 
to potential future scientific progress (no particular view of phenomenal introspection is 
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currently as well justified as special relativity, but we can very reasonably bet that one of them 
ultimately will be), which would seriously undermine the very project of the Moorean 
argument. Illusionists could also consider the basis of their argument to be, not a particular 
scientific theory (of, say, introspection), but the (much better-confirmed) disjunction of the 
scientific theories which have the appropriate features (i.e. they do not mention phenomenal 
consciousness as an explanans). As for (b), it will have to face up to the fact that many received 
scientific arguments against common sense beliefs also make some implicit appeal to 
philosophical (epistemological) principles. In other words, many of these scientific arguments, 
including the canonical argument against the reality of absolute simultaneity, are themselves 
scientific-cum-philosophical arguments. Susanna Rinard (Rinard, 2013, p. 189‑198) makes a 
very convincing case for this, by stressing that the scientific argument against absolute 
simultaneity itself crucially appeals to philosophical assumptions (in a nutshell, it requires 
preferring special relativity over the empirically equivalent neo-Lorentzian alternative, and this 
preference can itself only be justified by appealing to a philosophical principle favoring views 
that are metaphysically simpler).18 
Hence, because this kind of response faces serious difficulties, and because it is not the 
one used by Chalmers, I will not focus on it in what follows. 
The second, more attractive possibility consists in stating that the Moorean argument 
against illusionism is just of a different kind than the other Moorean arguments. One could grant 
that in “normal” cases, scientific-cum-philosophical arguments can overturn obvious 
commonsensical claims (rendering Moorean arguments ineffective), but the case of 
consciousness is different. On this view, the Moorean argument against illusionism is really a 
“super-Moorean” argument, its crucial premise endowed with “super-Moorean” certainty – a 
kind of certainty that is stronger than “standard” Moorean certainty, and which allows one to 
counter even arguments which crucially appeal to science. Such position appears to be adopted 
by Chalmers, who concedes that apparently obviously true claims have sometimes be shown to 
be false, but stresses that this should not be worrisome for the Moorean argument against 
illusionism. The reason for this is that its crucial first premise is more obvious than any scientific 
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or philosophical view that might support illusionism. This is tantamount to the claim that we 
know this premise with what I called “super-Moorean” certainty. 
When the contrast between standard Moorean arguments and the Moorean argument 
against illusionism is thus clarified, proponents of the Moorean argument against illusionism 
seem to lose some dialectical ground. They cannot as easily benefit from the support of the 
(numerous) philosophers who put their trust in Moorean arguments and agree that philosophy 
alone cannot overturn common-sense. One can concede this while insisting that science can 
overturn common-sense, and then note that arguments for illusionism are a posteriori in nature 
(and make a crucial appeal to science). Beyond their superficial resemblance, there is a crucial 
difference in status between the Moorean argument against illusionism and more standard 
Moorean argument. The two do not stand or fall together. The Moorean argument against 
illusionism must thus be assessed on its own merits. 
The upshot of the forgoing is that the defender of the Moorean argument must claim 
that the existence of phenomenal pain is not only obvious, but super-obvious: uniquely obvious, 
in a way that grounds the “super-Moorean certainty” mentioned earlier. “Mere” obviousness 
grounding “mere” Moorean certainty is not enough. 
 What would such unique obviousness consist in? It cannot simply come down to the 
fact that many of us believe in the existence of phenomenal states considerably more strongly 
(or more stubbornly) than they believe “standard” Moorean facts, and so that they would never 
abandon their beliefs – not even when faced with scientific arguments. This putative unique 
strength of their beliefs would be a mere psychological fact. It is not clear why it should have 
any epistemic import.19 Interpreting this unique obviousness as amounting to a stronger belief 
would also imply that the Moorean argument against illusionism works for some (the true 
believers!), but not for the others, which seems like an uncomfortable consequence.20 So, this 
unique obviousness has to go beyond mere psychological confidence, and be something of 
epistemic import: the defender of the Moorean argument against illusionism must claim that 
the existence of phenomenal states is uniquely obvious, in the sense that we should believe in 
                                                     
19 See (Kelly, 2005) for a convincing criticism of the view (ascribed to (Pollock & Cruz, 1999; Soames, 2005)) 
that what the obviousness of Moorean premises consists in is some sort of high degree of psychological confidence. 
20 This point is independent of the debate on whether Moorean arguments can play offense against the skeptic 
(taking up the burden of proof and providing a successful positive argument for the non-skeptic conclusion) or can 
only play defense (merely showing that skeptical argumentation fails). Indeed, the uncomfortable consequence I 
am pointing out is not that this interpretation of the Moorean argument against illusionism makes it incapable of 
converting already-convinced illusionists, but that it renders it ineffective even for the phenomenal realist whose 
faith is not sufficiently unshakable – the one who is open to discussion.  




it more than we should believe in standard Moorean facts (or in the conclusion of scientific 
arguments to the contrary). 
 This captures the way in which Chalmers thinks about the conditions of success of the 
Moorean argument. It is also similar to the way in which Bryan Frances – who, ten years before 
Chalmers, endorsed something close to the Moorean argument against illusionism 
(“eliminativism about feelings”)21 – articulated his reasoning: 
 
“Even if all the philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists were screaming at my door 
‘No one has ever had a painful feeling! There are no feelings! No one has ever been in 
pain!’ I would still know that I have had loads of painful feelings. My ‘‘access’’ to my 
painful feeling is so reliable or direct that I can epistemically neutralize, without even 
thinking about it, any hypothesis that says I have no feelings. I might be wrong about 
the location of the feeling, but there’s no way in hell I’m wrong that I have a painful 
feeling”. (Frances, 2008, p. 588) 
 
 The best answer available to the defender of the Moorean argument against illusionism 
then seems to consist in stressing the uniquely obvious character of phenomenal states 
(interpreted in an epistemic sense). How convincing is this answer? 
 
6. Unique obviousness called in question 
 
The proponents of the Moorean argument against illusionism must claim that the 
existence of phenomenal states is uniquely obvious, in some epistemic sense. Moreover, this 
epistemic superiority must be independent of the prior acceptance of philosophical views 
potentially implying the falsity of illusionism – on pain of begging the question. 
 Now, here’s the rub. Chalmers (as well as Frances) claims that we have such super-
Moorean certainty regarding the existence of phenomenal states. If he is right, his anti-
illusionist argument succeeds. However, at this point, I think that we can legitimately question 
this claim, and wonder: do we really have such super-Moorean certainty about phenomenal 
states? Should we really believe in the existence of phenomenal states more strongly than we 
do in other Moorean facts, and more strongly than in the conclusions of scientific-cum-
philosophical arguments to the contrary? 
                                                     
21 Although it is not entirely clear that Frances’ realist argument really concerns phenomenal feelings (Frances, 
2008, n. 8). 




 The question could at first glance appear illegitimate – or, at the very least, it might 
appear that we are not owed an answer. After all, isn’t the idea behind Moorean arguments 
simply that – one makes a claim so obvious that one can escape the burden of articulating an 
independent justification for it at all? However, the demand for justification here does not 
concern the premise used in the Moorean argument itself. Rather, it concerns the second-order 
claim that this premise has the required super-Moorean status needed for the argument to 
succeed. That such a question can legitimately be asked when faced with any new putative 
Moorean argument is quite obvious – otherwise, one could provide convincing super-Moorean 
arguments for absolutely anything. Moreover, as stated earlier, one can very well accept all 
standard Moorean arguments, without questioning the status of their premises, whilst being 
more cautious about this one, which seriously departs from its more modest cousins. Finally, 
that this question can – and should – be raised can be made even clearer when thinking about 
past failures of arguments purported to rebuke scientific-cum-philosophical claims on the basis 
of obvious and immediately accessible facts. Think, for example, about a philosopher like 
Bergson (Bergson, 1999), who in the 1920’s attacked the relativistic claim that there can be no 
absolute simultaneity between distinct events, by appealing to some sort of direct and intimate 
epistemic relation to time – or more precisely to what he called “duration” (durée).22 What 
Bergson then tried to do was rebuke the conclusion of a scientific-cum-philosophical argument 
by appealing to something obvious – something so obvious, and so immediately grasped, that 
he thought it should be believed over any scientific theory. Bergson, a great philosopher of the 
past, sincerely believed that he had the required kind of certainty regarding the existence of 
absolute simultaneity to maintain that it indeed exists. Yet, most people now think he was 
mistaken. The lesson of this cautionary tale is that we should be wary when great philosophers 
nowadays sincerely believe that they have a similar kind of certainty regarding the existence of 
their phenomenal states. 
As such, I think that we can legitimately ask: is the existence of phenomenal states really 
uniquely obvious in the appropriate sense?23 Many philosophers would answer “yes” and claim 
that we can be uniquely certain of the reality of our phenomenal states, and that we do have the 
                                                     
22 It is not clear, however, that Bergson attempted to defend inter-subjective absolute simultaneity.  
23 Asking this question comes close to raising what Keith Frankish calls the “hard meta-problem” (Frankish, 2019): 
the problem of determining what could ground the confidence of phenomenal realists that something more than 
their intuitions about consciousness needs explaining. Frankish defends illusionism by focusing on the exact kind 
of metaphysical facts – e.g. regarding acquaintance – that would have to obtain in order for this confidence to be 
grounded. He argues that they do not plausibly obtain. My strategy, as will be made clear, instead leaves out the 
details of the exact account needed by the realist, and further pursues the dialogue with the realist at a higher-order 
level (regarding what grounds their confidence in this confidence, etc.) until the realist’s intuitions give up. 




appropriate kind of epistemic relation to phenomenal states (sometimes articulating this idea in 
terms of acquaintance, given-ness, immediacy, direct presentation, etc.). They could even claim 
that it is obvious that we have this epistemic relation. Let’s grant here that it seems obvious that 
we have this epistemic relation to experiences. On this topic, however, we will receive bad news 
from science. Indeed, scientific views which putatively lend support to the first premise of the 
coincidence argument for illusionism (typically, scientific theories of phenomenal 
introspection, intuitive dualism, etc.) will also draw a picture of phenomenal introspection and 
phenomenal judgment which features no such unique epistemic relation to consciousness (as 
phenomenal consciousness does not even need to be mentioned in these views) – nor, arguably, 
to anything of this kind. These views would also hypothetically explain our strong intuitions 
regarding our unique epistemic relation to consciousness independently of any such unique 
epistemic relation (and of consciousness) – as the intuition that we have a peculiar epistemic 
relation to consciousness arguably features amongst our intuitions regarding consciousness (or 
at the very least in on a par with them). 
So, illusionists will easily build a second-order coincidence argument against the 
correctness of our intuition that we have an appropriate unique epistemic relation to 
phenomenal states (they could also probably build a second-order argument from the 
anomalousness of this relation, but let’s set that aside here). And this powerful scientific-cum-
philosophical argument, mounted against the correctness of our intuition that we have an 
appropriate unique epistemic relation to phenomenal states, should be able to overturn this 
intuition (as we admitted that strong scientific-cum-philosophical arguments are enough to 
overturn seemingly obvious claims). At this stage of the dialectical situation, we should thus 
conclude that we do not have such unique epistemic relation to phenomenal states – and the 
burden of proof would now lie on the anti-illusionist to defend that we do.  
One tempting way to defend the claim that we really have this unique epistemic relation 
to phenomenal states would be, for the friends of consciousness, to claim that this epistemic 
relation is not only obvious (mere obviousness is not enough against scientific-cum-
philosophical arguments), but that it is also uniquely obvious. We also have super-Moorean 
certainty regarding this very relation. Thus, they would build a second-order Moorean (or, 
rather, super-Moorean) argument for the existence of this epistemic relation. 
(Of course, the friends of consciousness could also try to defend the existence of such 
epistemic relation in another way – without simply relying on an appeal to its unique 
obviousness. I will come back to that later). 




One can already see where this is going. Illusionists will wonder whether this second-
order unique obviousness really obtains. They will argue, again, that this (third-order!) question 
is legitimate, and that scientific views (say, of introspection) deliver bad news in this respect 
(as a third-order coincidence argument will show). The friends of consciousness, again, will be 
led to stating that it is obvious that this second-order unique obviousness obtains – and even, as 
will be required, uniquely obvious. Thus, they will have to claim that it is uniquely obvious that 
it is uniquely obvious that it is uniquely obvious that they are phenomenally conscious. The 
same dialectic can then be reiterated at the fourth-order, fifth-order, sixth-order, etc. ad 
infinitum. 
However, the crucial point is this: at some level, the friends of consciousness will not 
be able to pull off one of their key moves anymore. Indeed, at some level n, it simply will not 
be obvious that they really have the required unique epistemic relation at the level n-1. That 
they really have the required unique epistemic relation at n-1 will simply not plausibly feature 
in their strong pre-theoretical intuitions – it will not fall in the domain of what seems obviously 
true. Consequently, it will cease to be an obvious commonsensical claim. This must occur at 
some stage in the dialectic, as there are no obvious commonsensical claims that involve 
arbitrarily high levels of complexity. Whether this happens at the fourth-order, tenth-order or 
fifty-fifth-order is irrelevant here – the important point is simply that there has to be a level at 
which one cannot anymore plausibly claim that they have correspondingly complex strong and 
nevertheless pre-theoretical intuitions. But, if at some level n one cannot reasonably claim that 
it is obvious that one has the required unique epistemic relation at n-1, then there is no way to 
counter the strong scientific-cum-philosophical argument against the existence of this relation 
at n-1. And if one denies the reality of this epistemic relation at n-1, one cannot counter the 
strong scientific-cum-philosophical argument against the existence of this relation at n-2, etc. 
Travelling back down levels, one will ultimately be led to admit that we do not have the unique 
epistemic relation to phenomenal states required for the Moorean argument against illusionism 
to work. 
Will this fast round trip across levels convince the friends of consciousness to abandon 
the Moorean argument against illusionism? Maybe. Some of them could be convinced, and turn 
to other ways to defend their view against illusionism – or, why not, change their mind and 
embrace illusionism! Others might maintain that they do really have the unique epistemic 
relation to phenomenal states needed for their argument to succeed. As they cannot just state 
that it is uniquely obvious that this epistemic relation obtains (this would lead to the dialectics 
I just described), they could claim: (a) that it is not legitimate (or intelligible) to call this 




epistemic relation in question. Given that similar questioning is obviously acceptable and 
intelligible in neighboring cases, such as Bergson’s, they will have to say that the case of 
consciousness is special. Or (b) they could concede that this questioning is intelligible and 
legitimate, but try to make the case for the reality of our unique epistemic relation to 
consciousness without appealing to the claim that this unique epistemic relation is itself 
uniquely obvious.24 For example, (b.1) they could try to defend the idea that we have a unique 
epistemic relation to phenomenal states with some sort of other argument – say, a transcendental 
argument, stating that this unique epistemic relation to phenomenal states is a necessary 
condition for the existence of very crucial things that everyone, including illusionists, probably 
have to accept (this relation to consciousness might be necessary, say, for the possession of 
justified beliefs – including the justified scientific beliefs upon which the illusionist is reliant 
for their own arguments to succeed)25. Alternatively, (b.2) they could claim that the unique 
epistemic relation to consciousness they posit is transparent ad infinitum: it gives us super-
Moorean certainty that consciousness is real, and super-Moorean certainty that we have this 
first super-Moorean certainty, and super-Moorean certainty that we have this second kind of 
super-Moorean certainty, etc. This position might attract philosophers who are sympathetic to 
understanding of consciousness based on acquaintance. Russell, for instance, famously claimed 
that we are not only acquainted with sense-data, but also with our very acquaintance with them 
(Russell, 1912, chapter 5). One could take things further and thus claim that we are acquainted 
with our experiences, and at the very same time with our acquaintance with our experiences, 
with our acquaintance with this second acquaintance, etc. ad infinitum. By claiming that all the 
required certainties are given at the same first-order level, the friends of consciousness could 
try and avoid the difficulties which arise from having to contend that complex n-th-order level 
claims are intuitively obvious. 
However, these answers all suffer from the same flaw. They all crucially appeal to 
contentious philosophical views. Indeed, it could be that the unique obviousness of phenomenal 
consciousness cannot legitimately be called into question (as opposed to what happens in other 
cases wherein someone claims that something is similarly obvious), or that this unique 
obviousness is a condition of possibility of justification itself, or that it involves a transparent 
presentation of infinite epistemic relations, etc. However, none of these claims can be 
reasonably contended to be found in the domain of obvious commonsensical, pre-theoretical 
                                                     
24 Such a move could also be made at some higher level the dialectics (third-order, fourth-order), but my response 
would be the same. 
25 (Merlo, 2020) might be read as providing suggestions in that direction. 




claims – they all traffic in contentious, debatable, and highly theoretical philosophical claims. 
If indeed one of them is needed to defend the Moorean argument, then the corresponding 
defense is worth no more than the claim itself. And if each of them happens to entail the falsity 
of illusionism (which is something I find rather plausible, although I do not intend to argue for 
that here), this means that the defense of the Moorean argument against illusionism will end up 
simply begging the question against illusionism.  
Two important things to be noted. First: of course, there might be other potential ways 
to defend the Moorean argument that I did not consider here. For instance, they might be other 
arguments for the claim that we do really have the appropriate unique epistemic relation to 
consciousness. Note, however, that at this stage the burden of proof lies on the proponent of the 
Moorean argument: given the existence of a strong scientific-cum-philosophical argument 
against the existence of this unique epistemic relation (strong enough to counter the “mere” 
obviousness of this relation), the onus is now on them to provide a reason to believe that it in 
fact really holds. Besides, note that, even if it is of course impossible to say anything against 
their hypothetical argument before it is put forth, one can already see that such an argument 
will face serious constraints. If this argument consists in deducing the existence of such a unique 
epistemic relation from a philosophical thesis, the illusionist could arguably find ways to point 
out that the thesis is itself contentious and potentially implies the falsity of illusionism – thus 
accusing the proponent of the Moorean argument of begging the question. Maybe one could 
devise a strong argument that combines intuitive premises and philosophical premises (that do 
not imply the falsity of illusionism and that are, hopefully, not contentious), and concludes to 
the reality of this epistemic relation (without having to claim that this relation is itself uniquely 
obvious). Note that the intuition mobilized here would have to be such that the illusionist could 
not build a strong scientific-cum-philosophical argument opposing it. Not also that the resulting 
argument would really need to be quite strong, so that, when opposed to the second-order 
scientific-cum-metaphysical illusionist argument, the rational outcome must be a low credence 
for the negation of this epistemic relation (less than 0.5). Finally, note that, if we are left with a 
low but non-negligible credence for the negation of this unique epistemic relation (say, 0.2), 
the friends of consciousness will have to accept that there is a non-negligible epistemic 
possibility that the Moorean argument does not succeed. They would have ruled out illusionism, 
but not in a clearly conclusive manner. Whether or not they should consider that a success is 
better left to future discussion, as the onus is anyway now on them to provide an appropriate 
argument in defense of the relevant unique epistemic relation. 




Second: the reader can notice that I did not argue that the justification of the first premise 
of the Moorean argument itself begs the question (or fails), but that the defense of the argument 
against the illusionist worry begs the question (or fails). And indeed, it is clear that, if any of 
the contentious philosophical views I described were true, e.g. if we were really acquainted in 
this peculiar infinite way with phenomenal states, we would have super-Moorean certainty 
regarding these phenomenal states, and this certainty would not depend on the antecedent 
acceptance of any philosophical view, so that the premise of the Moorean argument would be 
appropriately justified in a non-question-begging manner. But what matters here is whether or 
not we should believe that it is the case that this justification obtains – and I attempted to show 
that, if we do not presuppose the truth of some contentious (and potentially question-begging) 
philosophical views, we should not. 
What does this “more meta than thou” reasoning, appealing to seemingly complex 
discussions through potentially infinite levels, really consist in? The idea, in a nutshell, is quite 
simple. The most natural interpretation of our current best science opposes a picture in which 
our standard intuitive judgments about our phenomenal states are correct (this is the standard 
illusionist argument). One might want to fight this argument with brute, strong intuitions 
regarding the existence of phenomenal states, as well (maybe) as regarding our epistemic 
relation with them: this is the Moorean argument canvassed here. However, the most natural 
interpretation of our best science also opposes a picture on which our judgments regarding our 
epistemic relation to phenomenal states are correct, and also a picture on which our judgments 
regarding our epistemic relation to this epistemic relation are correct, and a picture in which 
our judgments regarding our epistemic relation to this epistemic relation to this epistemic 
relation are correct, etc. ad infinitum. Along this potentially infinite chain of debunking 
arguments, our intuition has to break at some point, as we enter domains in which we have no 
pre-theoretical inclinations (of course, some will have decided in advance that they should 
report no such break of intuition, or that they should refuse to move across levels, but, as I tried 
to show, they probably do so just because they have adopted some appropriate contentious 
philosophical view in the first place). Once we have reached this point, we realize that we 
should not have been so very sure about the existence of phenomenal states in the first place – 








If illusionism is coherent and well-supported by strong scientific-cum-philosophical 
arguments, then it cannot be ruled out without begging the question simply because it seems 
obviously false. 
 My argument does not purport to show that one should accept illusionism. Nor does it 
purport to show that illusionism really is coherent or well-supported. Moreover, everything I 
have said is compatible with the view that there are convincing non-Moorean arguments against 
illusionism. My argument is also compatible with the view that some of the question-begging 
contentious philosophical theses needed to defend the anti-illusionist Moorean argument 
against my attacks might happen to be true, and/or defensible by some strong, independent and 
themselves non-question-begging arguments. It is also compatible with the view that there 
might be some strong, independent and non-question-begging argument, which would 
successfully defend the claim that we have the unique epistemic relation to phenomenal 
experiences needed for the Moorean argument to succeed (but it is now up to the friends of 
consciousness to come up with this argument). 
 Besides, everything I said is compatible with the view that the existence of phenomenal 
states indeed seems obvious (but not uniquely obvious) and that this apparent obviousness 
should have some dialectical weight in the debate around phenomenal realism – just not enough 
to rule out illusionism! My argument is therefore compatible with the view that standard 
Moorean arguments (opposing the counter-intuitive conclusions of purely philosophical 
arguments) are successful. What I said is in fact even compatible with the view (that I am 
independently inclined to reject) that there are topics on which we do possess the super-
Moorean certainty needed to reject even the conclusions of strong scientific-cum-philosophical 
arguments – for example, when, contrary to what happens with consciousness, we do not also, 
at the same time, face a strong scientific-cum-philosophical challenge against our possession 
of such super-Moorean certainty. My attack against the anti-illusionist argument was only made 
possible by the fact that the basis of good arguments for illusionism is identical to (or very close 
to) the basis of good arguments against the view that we have the kind of certainty needed to 
rule out good arguments for illusionism, and the basis of good arguments against the view that 
we have the kind of certainty to rule out these second-order good arguments, etc. ad infinitum.  
But my reasoning does not presuppose that the situation is necessarily the same for all other 
putative cases of super-Moorean certainty outside the domain of consciousness. 
 So, what I hope to have shown is really not much – although it might mean a lot: we 
should not be so sure of the existence of phenomenal states. The truth of illusionism is thereby 
left an open question. 
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